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The Looming
Japanese Crisis
After more than a decade of economic stag-
nation and minimal structural change, Ja-
pan stands on the brink of outright finan-
cial crisis—the only debate is whether the
Japanese government can dodge its immi-
nent economic threats for another six
months at most, or ride the wave of global
expansion to throw still more money at these
problems with decreasing effectiveness un-
til the public debt becomes unsustainable
(which should be no later than 2005). Ei-
ther way, volatility in Japanese asset mar-
kets will be extremely high for the next 36
months, with significant declines on aver-
age in asset prices and the yen.
Japanese savers remain highly risk-
averse and this puts a drag on change in
general and provides a buffer for policy mis-
takes—their passivity should not be exag-
gerated, however, and cannot be depended
upon to stave off crisis.1  In the last six
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months, in anticipation of deposit insurance
limits and bank failures, over ¥100 trillion
in household savings has been moved from
weaker banks to cash, gold, offshore ac-
counts, and the four “too-big-to-fail” merged
banks. Given the ongoing drain of liquidity
from Japanese asset markets, the move-
ment of even a few percent more of house-
hold savings, along with the remaining
mobile international capital in Japan, could
produce large declines in asset prices. Such
movements would rapidly intensify both the
current credit crunch for Japanese small-
and medium-sized enterprises and the
Japanese government’s mounting fiscal dif-
ficulties.
A reasonable baseline forecast for the
Japanese economy is for modest growth,
driven by exports of manufactures and the
end of the inventory cycle.2  I argued in early
2001, however, that the Japanese govern-
ment then faced a choice between decisive
1.  Adam S. Posen, Restoring Japan’s Economic Growth,
Washington: Institute for International Economics,
1998, chapter 4.
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preemptive action and outright financial crisis.3  But
no decisive action has been taken since the Koizumi
cabinet took office in April 2001. Therefore, the down-
side risks make it very unlikely that the baseline fore-
cast will be achieved—in fact, the Japanese economy
is likely to tumble into crisis sometime before the
Diet’s supplemental budget process begins in Sep-
tember 2002. This reflects Japan’s increasing vul-
nerability to shocks, now that it is caught in the tight-
ening vise of debt-deflation and fiscal erosion. There
is no shortage of potential triggers for such a crisis
in coming months. One most likely trigger would be
contingent claims becoming explicit on the govern-
ment balance sheet, the impact of which would be
amplified by policy mistakes. A crisis in Japan would
not be Argentina redux, but it would have severe con-
sequences for the country and the world economy.
Crisis in Japan is not yet inevitable. A compre-
hensive policy package of bank closures and recapi-
talization, money-financed Bank of Japan (BoJ) pur-
chases of long-term Japanese government bonds
(JGBs), and replacement of public works spending
with tax cuts could still save the Japanese economy
from this fate. By putting distressed assets back on
the market and removing uncertainty, asset markets
would soar and Japan would grow at or above poten-
tial for an extended period (2.5 percent plus per an-
num).4  Increased explicit pressure from the US and
other governments could somewhat increase the
chances of such a policy package being adopted. This
policy brief makes the sober but realistic assump-
tion, however, that there will be no meaningful change
in Japanese economic policy until a crisis hits, and
actions taken then will likely be too late to forestall
the negative impact.
Increasing Vulnerability to Shocks
Japan is running out of room for error in its eco-
nomic policy. President George Bush’s February 2002
visit to Tokyo did not result in any new initiatives by
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to clean up the
bad loans—in fact, the disclosure by the Financial
Services Agency (FSA) that results of this year’s “spe-
cial inspections” of banks would be disclosed only by
bank category without revealing specific banks’ situ-
ations, confirms that supervisory scrutiny is moving
backwards.5  The mid-February 2002 firing of former
Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka burst the bubble of
Koizumi’s popularity—the initial 30-plus percent drop
in his approval ratings has been sustained and ac-
cording to most recent polls, the Koizumi cabinet’s
disapproval ratings now exceed its approval ratings.6
Diet opposition both within and outside of the LDP-
coalition is sufficient to block any Koizumi initiative,
and the opposition has increased since Tanaka’s fir-
ing.
This combination of falling popularity and Diet
opposition makes it very unlikely that the Koizumi
government will respond to Japan's economic prob-
lems during its remaining time in office (which is the
foreseeable future). A game of chicken amongst the
"responsible" ministries (BoJ, FSA, Ministry of Fi-
nance [MoF]) is stalemating any progress on policy—
neither the Cabinet Office nor Koizumi can break it
up in the absence of external pressure or overwhelm-
ing popular support. The lack of any clear alterna-
tive to Koizumi for prime minister makes it likely he
will hold on to the office, be spared explicit pressure
from the United States, and remain ineffectual, until
an outright crisis hits.
Yet, in the absence of preemptive policy action,
two powerful economic forces are pushing the Japa-
nese economy toward outright crisis. One is the vi-
3. Adam Posen, “Japan 2001: Decisive Action or Financial Panic,”
Institute for International Economics Policy Brief 01-4, March
2001.
4. This potential solution is discussed in Adam S. Posen, “Macro-
economic Prospects and Policy Options for Japan,” January 15,
2002 revision of speech given at “Where Does the Japanese
Economy Go From Here?” Conference, Columbia Business School,
November 1, 2001; see http://www.iie.com/papers/
posen0102.htm. US Council of Economic Advisers Chair R. Glenn
Hubbard advocated a nearly identical policy package for Japan in
a recent speech. See “Impediments to Growth in Japan,” at the
NBER Conference on Structural Impediments to Growth in Ja-
pan, Tokyo, March 19, 2002.
5. See “FSA to Release Bank Inspection Results On Combined
Basis: Yanagisawa,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 19, 2002, 1.
6.  In the Asahi Shimbun opinion poll of April 1-2, 2002, public
approval fell to 40 percent, while the disapproval rating rose to
44 percent. See “Disapproval of Koizumi’s Cabinet Exceeds Ap-
proval for First Time,” Japan Digest, April 3, 2002, 1.
[T]he Japanese government … faced
a choice between decisive preemptive
action and outright financial crisis. But
no decisive action has been taken since
the Koizumi cabinet took office in April
2001. Therefore, the Japanese
economy is likely to tumble into crisis
sometime before the Diet’s
supplemental budget process
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cious spiral of debt-deflation, which has now accel-
erated in Japan. Every succeeding month of defla-
tion raises the real burden of outstanding debt and
decreases consumer demand, both of which increase
the number of bad loans; every additional bad loan
decreases credit available to viable businesses and
further depresses asset (especially real estate) prices,
reinforcing deflation (figure 1 shows the declining
Japanese price level).
While always theoretically possible, debt-defla-
tion has now become a palpable reality in Japan.
Even on the government’s vastly understated esti-
mates of nonperforming loans, classification IV (“risk
management” or defaulted) loans have been rising
more quickly than banks can provision (given their
diminished capital and profits), an imbalance unseen
even in 1998. Figure 2 shows the ratio of new classi-
fication IV loans to banks’ write-offs of bad debt,
which now is higher than one—this is an explosive
process and ultimately unsustainable for more than
a few quarters without government intervention in
the form of bank closures and recapitalizations.7  Even
if attempted, that recapitalization, however, may not
be easily managed.
This is because the second force at work is the
well-known accumulation of gross public debt in Ja-
pan, which reached over 130 percent of GDP in
FY2001 (see figure 3). Admittedly, the threat to sol-
vency this presents for the Japanese government is
often exaggerated:8 net public debt is much lower than
gross debt, even after discounting most government
assets; gross household savings remains in excess
of 200 percent of the value of GDP; only 5 to 6 per-
cent of JGBs are held by foreigners; and all Japa-
nese public debt is denominated in yen.
There remains, however, the risk of a liquidity
crisis in the JGB market from several sources, in-
cluding (1) preemptive downgrades by bond rating
agencies; (2) a falloff in tax revenues associated with
debt-deflation;9 (3) a collapse of a bankrupt local or
prefectural government and the associated banks,
requiring a public bailout;10 and (4) the need to sud-
denly inject a large amount of capital into the banks
or the deposit insurance system in response to a bank
run.
Any of these, almost certainly accompanied by a
sudden rise in rates on long-term JGBs, would tip
the government’s debt dynamics into as unsustain-
able a process as the private debt, where new debt
accumulates faster than principal and interest can
7. Of course, if total official bad loan numbers—let alone more
realistic independent estimates of outstanding bad loans—were
used, rather than the minimum bound of  Classification IV loans,
the ratio would be many times higher.
8. Posen, 1998, op cit, Chapter 3.
9. The drag from recession on tax revenue is the real source of
Japan’s rising deficits, not so much public works spending. See
Kenneth N. Kuttner and Adam S. Posen, “Passive Savers and
Fiscal Policy Effectiveness in Japan,” Institute for International
Economics working paper 02-2 (forthcoming in the Journal of the
Japanese and International Economies), http://www.iie.com/cata-
log/wp/2002/02-2.pdf.
10. Almost all local and prefectural Japanese governments are in
significant debt, if not bankruptcy, and fund their debt through


















































Figure 1  Deflation in Japan
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, February 2002.
CPI
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Figure 2  Growth of bad loan burden
Figure 3  Fiscal indicators for Japan














































































































































































Source: Annual data from Financial Services Agency, Classification IV (“Risk Management”) loans, “Loss to Banks
on Disposal of Bad Loans.”  FY 2001 is computed from an official projection.
Interest payment as a percent of
total government expenditures       May 2002 PB02-5 5
be paid. With the annual government deficits cur-
rently running at 8 percent of GDP, the current rela-
tively low share of interest payments in Japanese
government expenditures (shown in figure 3) would
rise quickly with increasing interest rates. Even in
the absence of interest rate increases, the Japanese
government can afford at most three additional years
of slow or negative growth before those explosive debt
dynamics kick in, and 2002 will already use up one
of those.
It is reasonable to argue that neither of these un-
derlying dynamics constitutes an “action-forcing
event” in the near term, that is a shock that will move
faster than Japanese authorities can respond to, in
and of themselves. And the noted passivity of Japa-
nese savers does give the government some leeway.
Still, the underlying dynamics and eroding confidence
act in the other direction, diminishing the Japanese
government’s room for error; a pickup in exports to
the United States will provide only limited additional
growth cushion.11  The list of potential, if not likely,
shocks that could accelerate these dynamics is long
(see section on “Potential Triggers for the Crisis” on
page 8).
In any event, the March run-up in Japanese eq-
uities and in the yen against the dollar should not
fool anyone into thinking that the economy has mean-
ingfully strengthened. The recent equity/exchange
rate appreciation in Japan is the result of two fac-
tors unlikely to have a lasting impact: the annual
repatriation of cash ahead of the March 31 fiscal year-
end by indebted Japanese banks and companies hold-
ing foreign assets, and the good news on the US
economy updating the markets’ expectations of ex-
ports to the United States.12  These transient effects
were amplified by the aggressive tactics of the MoF
and FSA, including:
new restrictions on short selling forcing those (for-
eign) investors already in short positions to buy
in order to cover themselves;
     using threats of imposing those anti-short-sell-
ing regulations, and potential penalties, on large
sales of equities to deter even normal transac-
tions;13
     extreme pressure on the Trust Banks to buy eq-
uities;
•     reminding everyone that there is money on hand
to fend off bank runs, which will be disbursed
without conditions.
Various investors and businesses in Japan will make
their own assessments of when the debt-deflation
and/or the public debt burden are getting out of hand.
Until that time, the markets will be tentative at best
about yen-denominated assets, but will continue to
unload the better and more liquid of them. Brief sales
of foreign (US) assets by Japanese banks to acquire
cash will only feed further capital outflow with a lag
when the banks are unwilling to lend repatriated
funds domestically, and reach their limits on JGB
purchases—the result will be a downward trend punc-
tuated by occasional rallies, feeding volatility. The
passage of time will only increase the actual and per-
ceived likelihood of eventual crisis, bringing forward
the day that will “eventually” come to pass.
12. There seems to have been an overly optimistic reaction on
this latter score. All available evidence suggests a steadily and
significantly declining elasticity of Japanese exports to yen de-
preciation. See Satoru Horibe, “Can the Yen’s Depreciation Help
to Cure the Japanese Economy?” Tokyo-Mitsubishi Review, 7(3):
February 2002, and Mikihiro Matsuoka, “Is yen depreciation a
panacea? Evidence of declining support to corporate profits,”
Deutsche Bank Group Economic Research, February 25, 2002. Of
course, there are also political and economic limits to how much
one can expect US net imports and the trade deficit to increase
from present levels. See Catherine L. Mann, “How Long the Strong
Dollar?”  Institute for International Economics Policy Brief, forth-
coming.
13. On March 22, 2002, the Asahi Shimbun reported that “many
traders suspect the gains are just the result of excessive inter-
vention by the financial authorities’…verbal orders and threats
made privately by officials have stopped traders from making le-
gitimate sales. Fundamentally what FSA did was to spring a bear
trap, the paper said, forcing the shorts to scramble to cover their
positions.” To reinforce it, Asahi added, “officials have persistently
intervened in day-to-day activities of market players.” Transla-
tion in The Japan Digest, March 22, 2002, 1. Nonetheless, short-
selling accounted for almost a quarter of March 2002 trading on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, see Alex Skorecki, “Short-selling forms
25% of Tokyo share deals,” Financial Times, April 23, 2002, 17.
… two powerful economic forces
are pushing the Japanese economy
toward outright crisis …
the vicious spiral of debt-deflation
… [and] the well-known
accumulation of gross public
debt in Japan.
11. Only once since 1984 has either exports or net exports made
a positive growth contribution of 1 percent or more to Japanese
GDP. See Richard Jerram, “Exports Set to  Lead the Recovery,”
Economic News, ING Barings, March 20, 2002.
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What a Crisis in Japan Would Look Like14
Obviously, even an outright crisis in Japan would
not be on the scale of the Argentina crisis. Japan
remains too wealthy, retains too large a creditor po-
sition, and its government institutions remain too
entrenched for there to be a repeat of the type of
collapse seen in the southern cone. Yet, Japan has
far greater international implications given its size
and creditor status, and still has the potential for
dauntingly negative economic outcomes.
In essence, a crisis in Japan would be a repeat of
what happened there in end-1997/early-1998, but
on a larger scale and lasting more than a year. That
would entail:
•     flight of savings from Japanese banks into cash,
gold, foreign banks, and foreign (mostly dollar)
assets (as seen in figure 4, the currency-to-de-
posit ratio has been steadily rising since 1997,
consistent with households putting cash under
their mattresses rather than into the banking
system);
•     confused attempts by Japanese officials to run a
“price keeping operation” by purchasing equities
from banks, which will ultimately spur markets
further downward and hasten the exit of foreign
and sophisticated investors (this process has al-
ready begun, with those firms caught in the
March short-selling trap looking to extricate them-
selves);
•     sustained and accelerating falls in the yen (below
¥150/$) and in Japanese stock prices (below
9,000 on the Nikkei);
•      undiscounted business failures outside the bank-
ing system, likely in the construction, retail, and
life insurance sectors;
•      sharp declines in Japanese investment—as much
as 1 or 2 percent of GDP—beyond the slowdown
of the current recession (figure 5 shows the al-
ready widening spread between bank bonds and
JGBs, which is indicative of tightening credit con-
ditions);15 and
•   rapid  large spikes in long-term JGB rates and
additional downgrades by the rating agencies (fig-
ure 6 shows the rising market price for insur-
ance against default risk on 10-year JGBs, now
higher than in spring 1998).
The deservedly unsympathetic international re-
sponse would be likely to exacerbate matters. There
would be extreme volatility in international capital
markets, with flight of money out of Asia generally
and cascading regional depreciations against the US
14. I am indebted to Fred Bergsten, Mike Mussa, Marc Noland,
and Ted Truman for discussions thrashing out this scenario, but
do not implicate them for this forecast.
15. For a discussion of the credit crunch in Japan, see section 4
of Kenneth N. Kuttner and Adam S. Posen, “The Great Recession:
Lessons for Macroeconomic Policy from Japan,” Brookings Pa-
pers on Economic Activity , 2001:2, 93-185. The IBJ bond spread
shown in figure 5 is representative—all major bank bonds are
traded at large premiums over JGBs at present. In other words,
despite the disappearance of the traditional Japan premium (on
the three-month libor-based yen), Japanese banks are again pay-
ing a premium to borrow. See James Fiorillo, “Japan Premium

































































































































































































































































































































Source: Bank of Japan, http://www.boj.or.jp/en/siryo/siryo_f.htm.
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Source: ING Barings, UBS Warburg.
Figure 6  Credit spread on 10-year Japanese government bonds
Basis points
Figure 5  Credit spread between 5-year industrial Bank of Japan bonds and 5-year Japanese
               government bonds
Percentage points
Mid-1990s average
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dollar. In the United States, the industries most
heavily hit by import surges would be the usual sus-
pects of auto parts, electronics, and steel; the latter
has certainly demonstrated its protectionist clout. The
affected industries would put enormous political pres-
sure on the US Congress—so would Beijing, Seoul,
and other East Asian capitals on the US government—
to respond with trade threats at a minimum.16 Of
course, a financial crisis in Japan would also cause
some direct disruption in the US markets, but the
resulting economic effect would probably be limited—
although US banks’ exposure to Japan remains siz-
able ($33 billion as of September 2001), Japan’s share
in those banks’ total outstanding foreign exposure
has declined (especially their exposure to banks) and
US banks’ ability to withstand shocks is higher now
than in the 1980s or early 1990s.17  The impact will
also be felt in a political channel of transmission along
with the trade channel (I discuss this in the section
on “Possibilities for US Preemption and Responses,”
see  page 9).
Looking to the longer term, Japan "hitting the
wall" would ultimately be a two-part process, when-
ever it begins. The first part would be the realization
of contingent liabilities, disintermediation, and capi-
tal flight, as described. The second part would come
once a large part of the Japanese financial system
(not just banks) would have to pass through public
ownership, as a result of the crisis. This is standard
in major financial crises, even those in developed
economies (such as Sweden in the early 1990s). There
could then be an avoidable but likely mishandling of
the resale and privatization of those assets by the
Japanese government, particularly with regard to
foreign acquisition of those assets. Such mishandling
in that situation would once again deprive Japan of
capital and put off the day of recovery. However, this
second decision point would only be faced a year or
two after the first hit occurs because it would take
that long to stabilize the financial system through
nationalization. Over the medium term of 3-6 years,
one could expect Japan to finally stabilize its finan-
cial system, converging on the US model, with large-
scale foreign participation.18
Potential Triggers for the Crisis
Recent market manipulation and good luck (with
respect to the US recovery) has gotten the Japanese
government through the March 31 fiscal year-end
without incident. At some point in the near future,
however, a negative shock can be expected to force
the Japanese government to take on what is now a
contingent liability as an explicit and large expendi-
ture on the government's balance sheet. The most
likely candidates are  (1) insolvency of a regional or
prefectural government, with collapse of the attend-
ing mid-sized bank; (2) government assumption of
the pension fund obligations of a failed construction
or retail company; or (3) loss of savings of a number
of Japanese savers in a bankrupt life insurer. Alter-
natively, the government could be faced with such a
claim and have to publicly renege upon it.
Either way, when that shock occurs, there will
be a sudden spike in JGB interest rates as well as
increased scrutiny and fear of the rest of the contin-
gent liabilities in that class (other local governments,
other pension funds).19  There will also be some com-
bination of capital flight out of Japan, from the re-
maining liquid parts of the market, and further move-
ment of domestic Japanese funds from the banking
system into cash, gold, and postal savings. This will
cause investment to contract. The crisis scenario
spins out from there along the lines described in the
section on “What a Crisis in Japan Would Look Like”
(see page 6).
Even healthy economies have unexpected set-
backs and the ability of policymakers to respond to
them determines their ultimate impact on the
economy. Consider the list of likely policy-driven
shocks to the Japanese economy in coming months,
which are also factors likely to lead to the mishan-
dling and magnification of the effect of any exogenous
negative shocks that will occur:
16. For an assessment of the likely trade effects of a yen depre-
ciation, see Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Zhi Wang
(1999), “The Continuing Asian Financial Crisis: Global Adjust-
ment and Trade,”  Institute for International Economics working
paper No. 99-4; see http://www.iie.com/catalog/wp/1999/99-
4.htm.
17. I am grateful to Ted Truman for this assessment.
18. The argument for a long-term convergence between US and
Japanese financial sectors, and the implications of that for trans-
pacific relations, is given in Adam S. Posen (2002), “Finance,” in
U.S.-Japan Relations in a Changing World, Steven Vogel, ed.,
Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming, http://www.iie.com/
catalog/wp/2001/01-8.pdf.
In any event, the March run-up
in Japanese equities and in the yen
against the dollar should not fool
anyone into thinking that the
economy has meaningfully
strengthened.
19. Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures,
and Systemic Implications, Institute for International Econom-
ics, 1998, argues that a similar “wake up call” to investors re-
garding a class of potential financial problems contributed to the
Asian crisis.       Large movements of Japanese savings out of pri-
vate banks (already underway) turning into runs
before deposit insurance limits are imposed on
remaining bank accounts in April 2003;20
•    Continued declines in real estate prices driving
overt yakuza (organized crime) activity because
of the government’s refusal to put distressed as-
sets back on the market;
•     Revelations of unexpected insolvencies through-
out the banking and other sectors with mark-to-
market accounting, despite the recent stock mar-
ket gains;
•    A rise in long-term interest rates when Moody
and Standard & Poor’s downgrade Japanese debt
to borderline investment grade rating levels
(which they have already announced intentions
of doing);
•    Tax revenues falling off a cliff due to the reces-
sion while Koizumi remains pledged to a cap on
debt issuance of ¥30 trillion for FY2001;21
•    Koizumi's public support continuing to decline,
and Diet resistance to any initiatives by him in-
creasing as a result;
Escalation of the finger pointing between the BoJ,
the FSA, the MoF, and the Cabinet Office;
•    Further repetition of Finance Minister Masajuro
Shiokawa and FSA Minister Hakuo Yanagisawa's
unsupportable statements that the banking sys-
tem does not require public capital injections
unless a crisis hits, making it more difficult for
them to credibly respond to a problem;
Similar repetition by BoJ Governor Masaru
Hayami and his deputies of (equally unsupport-
able) statements that deflation is a supply-side
phenomenon and that more aggressive monetary
expansion risks causing hyperinflation;
•     Erosion of public confidence in the bureaucracy,
of unity in the governing coalition, and perhaps
creation of an accompanying criminal scandal,
due to the very public mishandling of food safety
and other health issues;22
     Scapegoating of China (for cheap labor) and of
the United States (for trying to buy Japanese as-
sets cheap) for Japanese economic decline, dis-
couraging necessary FDI flows in and out of Ja-
pan, particularly from and to the financial sec-
tor;
       Increasing trade frictions with China and emerg-
ing Asia. As the yen declines against the dollar,
Japanese companies cut orders from abroad, and
antidumping is used on both sides;
       Increasing trade frictions with the United States,
as the Japanese trade surplus rises, US export
industries get hit further, and US unemployment
lags the business cycle; and
Vulnerability to demonstrations of aggression
from North Korea (remember the missile overflight
of 1999), as well as to general terrorism, in its
role as US ally against the Axis of Evil.
This would not be an easy set of hurdles to clear,
even for an economy and a government in peak con-
dition. The assumption that nothing will go wrong—
that not even an earthquake will occur—seems un-
duly rosy. In fact, Japan has been quite lucky in the
past few years, thanks to a growing world economy,
a relative lack of protectionist pressures against it,
and, even by Japanese standards, an absence of di-
rect political opposition to government initiatives. This
is unlikely to last. And the underlying vulnerabilities
of the Japanese economy from banking fragility, debt-
deflation, and fiscal indebtedness make it ill-prepared
to withstand even small setbacks.
Possibilities for US Preemption and Responses
Beyond the direct economic impact, the United
States has a real national security interest in keep-
ing Japan from financial crisis and/or engaging in
competitive devaluation with no reform to show for
it. China, in particular, would play any crisis in Ja-
pan opportunistically, seeking to demonstrate its
leadership role in Asia (by maintaining its fixed ex-
change rate peg against the dollar) while criticizing
Japan. Given the Japanese government’s own na-
tionalism and mounting insecurity vis-à-vis China,
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20. Some ¥27trillion (equivalent to over 5 percent of GDP) had
left uninsured accounts in the year to January.
21. According to our rough estimates, if Koizumi’s debt cap is
maintained, and growth is 1.5 percent less than government fore-
casts in FY2001 (that is growth in line with most private sector
forecasts), the needed public sector contraction will take nearly
another 1 percent off of GDP over two years. See Kuttner and
Posen (2002), cited in footnote 9.
An outright crisis in Japan would
not be on the scale of the Argentina
crisis … [but] has the potential for
dauntingly negative economic outcomes
(given its size and creditor status).
22. On April 2, 2002, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported that the
coalition member Komeito Party’s president Takenori Kanzaki
called for the resignation of Agriculture Minister Tsutomu Takebe,
saying he should take responsibility for mishandling the mad







• •at least initially Japan would be prone to escalate
any trade or diplomatic conflict rather than negoti-
ate. Middle classes and politicians elsewhere in
emerging Asia will respond angrily to Japan for ex-
porting adjustment when they view themselves (jus-
tifiably or not) as having suffered in order to reform.
This could destabilize some regimes, worsen trade
conflicts with Japan, and shift additional exports to
the United States (further complicating American
attempts to build domestic support for the Doha trade
round, particularly any efforts to put antidumping
on the table). The Bush administration does not (and
should not) want such an outcome.
Through President Bush’s February 2002 visit to
Japan, however, the administration appeared intent
on treating Koizumi the way his father (George Bush
senior) treated then Russian President Boris Yeltsin
in the early 1990s—that is, the administration seemed
to think: "There are not any obvious alternatives, we
like the guy personally, he seems to be the best hope
of reform, no point in publicly pressuring him, we
will embrace him and hope that gives him the strength
to get good policies through.” There are reports that
President Bush was much more firm in his private
communications with Koizumi, including in a letter
leaked to the press. As was the case with Yeltsin,
however, such a tactic with Koizumi underestimates
US leverage and overestimates his inclination to re-
form. The point is moot whether Koizumi cannot or
just will not take decisive action; he becomes irrel-
evant, if not harmful, to US interests if he does not.
Therefore a more explicit policy of US pressure is
worth it for desired outcomes.
The idea that the United States has no choice
but to take what it can get from Koizumi overesti-
mates the strength of his bargaining position in two
ways. First, it misreads Koizumi’s priorities: his one
policy accomplishment so far, and what he chose to
spend his honeymoon political capital on, was ex-
panding the scope for Japanese military involvement.
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While the US defense establishment was very grati-
fied by this initiative, this should emphasize to that
establishment that Koizumi’s desires for foreign and
security policy would be frustrated were ongoing US
support and encouragement to be withdrawn. He
needs US backing for expression of his foremost pri-
ority.
Second, the idea that the United States is lack-
ing leverage does not take into account that the bu-
reaucrats and the LDP party backers are the ones
who still really run Japan on economic issues, though
their diminishing authority is creating something of
a power vacuum. This could have been different if
Koizumi had not squandered his initial popularity,
but it is now clearly back to business as usual. For
both these reasons, access to status and participa-
tion in world affairs, international organizations, and
especially to discussions over security and econom-
ics in Asia (e.g., relations with North Korea), all of
which the United States still controls, provides le-
verage over what Koizumi and his bureaucratic mas-
ters want.
The key is that the United States has to decide
from a foreign policy perspective to demand from the
Koizumi government the economically and symboli-
cally important step of a real bank cleanup. This is
rightly the only Japanese reform that will satisfy Asian
capitals, as well as the US Congress, and it is one of
the two key steps (along with ending deflation) needed
to arrest Japan's economic decline. Given that
Koizumi’s fulfillment of the US Defense Department’s
wish list post-September 11 did not  amount to much,
even those who advocated that our security alliance
should take precedence have to realize that Japan's
main contribution to Asian stability must come
through economic stability—especially when large
middle-income countries such as Argentina and Ko-
rea perceive themselves as having lost ground under
efforts to live up to painful reform demands in recent
years, while Japan has gotten away with exporting
its miseries.
It remains to be seen whether the Bush adminis-
tration turns its until-now friendly advice into an ef-
fective demand. On the economics side of the rela-
tionship, US CEA Chair R. Glenn Hubbard and Trea-
sury Secretary Paul O'Neill have pronounced in vis-
its to Tokyo the substantively justified and clear public
line that "yen depreciation will not solve Japan's bad
debt and deflation problems." Being right on the eco-
nomics is not enough, though—if the effects of self-
destructive economic policies were a deterrent to
Japan's leadership, we would not be in this mess in
the first place. That is why the message has to be:
"Yen depreciation without a bank cleanup and rising
unemployment in Japan is inexcusable, and a Ja-
pan that lets that happen will not be relied upon in
The United States should use the
now credible threat of "Japan passing"
 as the leverage… An ally should not be
left unchallenged for endangering
US foreign policy interests and global
stability just because it is an ally
and the source of the danger is
economic rather than military.23.  For a more sophisticated argument about this point, see C.
Fred Bergsten, Takatoshi Ito, and Marcus Noland, No More Bash-
ing: Building a New Japan-United States Economic Relationship,
Institute for International Economics, 2001.
24.  See Posen (2002), cited in footnote 4, for a more detailed
discussion of why domestic monetary expansion should be pre-
ferred to purchases of foreign assets as a means of reflation.
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future." There has to be a link made to something
the United States and/or the world will do to Japan
if Japan further damages world economic growth and
US national security interests.
It would, of course, be best for this to be done
multilaterally and through economic means. Given
the World Trade Organization, trade threats are out.23
The G-7 process could be one avenue. Yet, years of
reportedly forceful behind-closed-doors criticism in
the G-7 has not yielded results. It is time the rest of
the G-7 declared publicly that, until Japan under-
takes domestic financial reform and monetary refla-
tion, there will be no exchange rate intervention to
aid Japan should the yen strengthen, and that any
unilateral efforts by Japan to weaken the yen with-
out prior domestic reform will be opposed by coordi-
nated intervention. Clearly, a yen depreciation that
resulted from aggressive monetary expansion would
help fight deflation in Japan, but the bulk of that
battle has to be fought using domestic tools, and the
banking problems must also be faced.24  When Ja-
pan takes on both its debt and deflation problems, a
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yen depreciation should be welcomed (perhaps man-
aged) by the G-7.
Yet, exchange rate intervention and the G-7 have
their obvious limitations, and therefore the pressing
need to prevent crisis in Japan cannot be left to these
means alone. It requires US unilateral action as well,
particularly after September 11, precisely because this
is a foreign policy matter and involves our most im-
portant ally in Asia. Once the foreign policy side of
the US government does acknowledge this as prior-
ity and is willing to put the pressure on Japan, there
will be viable options. The threats must be commu-
nicated that Japan will be downgraded or ignored by
the United States in favor of China in various ways,
and will be allowed to take the blame for economic
destabilization in Asia, if it does not finally take re-
sponsible action.
In short, the United States should use the now
credible threat of "Japan passing" as the leverage.
This can be as simple as expanding bilateral discus-
sions with China while pointedly not keeping the
Japanese informed, or as provocative as making as-
senting murmurs to China on its efforts at free trade
with its ASEAN neighbors while remonstrating with
Japan on its agricultural protectionism, or as direct
as letting the Japanese government know (through
the press) that scenario planning is going on for an
Asian policy with an unimportant Japan. An ally
should not be left unchallenged for endangering US
foreign policy interests and global stability just be-
cause it is an ally and the source of the danger is
economic rather than military.